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The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB or 
Board) is to establish independence standards applicable to 
the audits of public entities in order to serve the public 
interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
the securities markets.  One of the Board’s most 
fundamental projects since its establishment has been the 
development of a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence to help the Board issue principles-based 
independence standards for auditors of public companies. 
 
After considering comments received on its Discussion 
Memorandum covering issues integral to the development 
of a framework for auditor independence, the Board is 
soliciting comment on this Exposure Draft (ED) of a 
proposed framework.  A separate list of Questions for 
Respondents follows for your convenience.  It would be 
particularly helpful to the Board in its future deliberations 
if you would respond to those questions and include in 
your comments the reasoning behind your responses.  We 
also welcome comments and suggestions on any other 
aspects of the proposed framework.  
 
The Board gratefully acknowledges the contributions made to 
the development, content, and writing of this Exposure Draft by 
the Director of the Conceptual Framework Project, Henry R. 
Jaenicke, C. D. Clarkson Professor of Accounting at Drexel 
University, and by the Associate Project Director, Alan S. 
Glazer, Professor of Business Administration at Franklin & 
Marshall College. 
 
Any individual or organization may obtain one copy of this 
Exposure Draft (ED 00-2), without charge, by contacting the 
ISB.  The ED is also available on the ISB website at 
www.cpaindependence.org. 
 
Your responses, which must be received by February 28, 2001, 
may be sent via: 
 
 1. mail   Independence Standards Board 
   6th Floor 
   1211 Avenue of the Americas 
   New York, NY 10036-8775 
 2. fax  (212) 596-6137 
 3. e-mail isb@cpaindependence.org 
 
Please reference ED 00-2 in your correspondence. 
 
All responses will be available for public inspection and 
copying for one year at the offices of the Independence 
Standards Board and also at the Knowledge Center of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, New 
Jersey.  
 
Thank you in advance for your time and effort. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This Statement describes a conceptual framework for auditor independence to be used: 
 
 as a foundation for developing principles-based independence standards,  
 
 as a guide for resolving independence issues in the absence of standards or other rules, 
and  
 
 as a resource to help investors, other users of financial information, and other interested 
parties better understand how the independence of auditors contributes to audit quality.  
 
The framework contains four interrelated components: a definition of auditor independence, a 
goal of auditor independence, concepts, and basic principles. 
 
The Statement defines auditor independence as freedom from those pressures and other factors 
that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions.  Compliance with rules and regulations governing auditor 
independence is necessary, but not sufficient, for an auditor to be considered independent under 
the definition.  An auditor also must be free from all pressures and other factors that 
compromise, or that well-informed investors and other users of financial information can 
reasonably expect to compromise, an auditor’s objectivity. 
 
The Statement states that the goal of auditor independence is to support user reliance on the 
financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency,  rather than focusing on 
independence as an end in itself. 
 
The concepts of auditor independence described in the Statement comprise a risk model for 
auditor independence: 
 
 Threats to auditor independence are sources of potential bias that may compromise, or 
may reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit 
decisions.  The Statement discusses five types of threats to auditor independence—self-
interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity (or trust), and intimidation—that may be posed 
by various activities, relationships, or other circumstances. 
 
 Safeguards to auditor independence are controls that mitigate or eliminate threats to 
auditor independence.  The Statement provides examples of the wide range of safeguards 
that exist in the present audit environment or that can be put in place in response to threats 
to auditor independence. 
 
 Independence risk is the risk that threats to auditor independence, to the extent that they 
are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise, or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.  
 
 The significance of a threat is the extent to which the threat increases independence risk 
and the effectiveness of a safeguard is the extent to which the safeguard decreases 
independence risk.  The Statement provides examples of factors that affect the significance 
of threats and the effectiveness of safeguards. 
 
The basic principles serve as guidelines to assist individuals and organizations that make 
independence decisions in analyzing independence issues in a wide variety of circumstances. 
The Statement specifies that only a very low level of independence risk should be considered 
acceptable because only such a level—one that implies a very small likelihood of compromised 
objectivity—is consistent with the definition and goal of auditor independence. 
 
The first two basic principles direct independence decision makers to assess the level of 
independence risk by considering the types and significance of threats to auditor independence 
and the types and effectiveness of safeguards and to determine whether the level of independence 
risk is at an acceptable position on the independence risk continuum. 
 
The third and fourth basic principles describe constraints that may affect the independence 
decision-making process.  The third basic principle states that independence decision makers 
should ensure that the benefits resulting from reducing independence risk by imposing additional 
safeguards exceed the costs of those safeguards.  
 
The fourth basic principle states that independence decision makers should consider the views of 
investors, other users, and others with an interest in the integrity of financial reporting when 
addressing issues related to auditor independence and should resolve those issues based on the 
decision makers’ judgment about how best to meet the goal of auditor independence. 
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This proposed Statement of Independence Concepts describes the components of a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence.  The Board welcomes comments and suggestions on all 
matters relating to the conceptual framework, particularly on the following issues.  Please 
discuss the reasoning behind any comments you make. 
 
 
DEFINITION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
 
1. The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom from 
those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.”  The definition and the basis 
for the Board’s conclusions are discussed in paragraphs 3–7 and 37–46.  The other components 
of the conceptual framework are intended to help independence decision makers apply the 
definition to a wide variety of auditor independence issues.  Is the definition appropriate?  If not, 
what changes would you suggest, and why?   
 
 
GOAL OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
 
2. The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of auditor independence is “to 
support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market 
efficiency.”  The goal and the basis for the Board’s conclusions are discussed in paragraphs 8–9 
and 47–48.  Is the goal appropriate?  If not, what changes would you suggest, and why?   
 
 
CONCEPTS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
 
3. The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles related to four concepts of 
auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and significance of 
threats/effectiveness of safeguards.  The concepts, basic principles, and the basis for the Board’s 
conclusions are discussed in paragraphs 10–32 and 49–60.  The concepts and basic principles 
contained in the proposed framework are intended to serve as guidelines for independence 
decision makers to analyze and resolve independence issues.  Are the concepts and basic 
principles appropriate and sufficiently operational?  If not, what changes would you suggest, and 
why?   
 
4. Paragraphs 49–53 describe the elements of a risk model for auditor independence in 
which independence risk is a function of the significance of threats to auditor independence and 
the effectiveness of safeguards to auditor independence.  What are your views on the 
appropriateness of the independence risk model?  Is there research that the Board should be 
made aware of that would be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise making it more useful 
for independence decision makers?  If so, please describe that research. 
 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
 
5. Are there other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual framework that the 
Board should consider?  If so, what are those issues, and how would you advise the Board to 
resolve them? 
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Statement of Independence Concepts  
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence 
 
INTRODUCTION—SCOPE AND CONTENT 
 
1. This Statement describes a conceptual framework for auditor independence.  Its principal 
purposes are: 
a. to help the Independence Standards Board (ISB or Board) meet its responsibilities 
to set sound and consistent standards by providing direction and structure for resolving 
independence issues; 
b. to assist other independence decision makers1 in resolving questions about 
independence in the absence of ISB standards and other independence rules; 
c. to help investors, other users of financial information, and other interested parties 
understand the nature, significance, and limitations of auditor independence; and 
d. to focus debate and serve as a boundary for discussions about auditor 
independence issues, thereby helping interested parties contribute to the development and 
application of, and better understand the rationale and process underlying, ISB standards. 
 
2. This Statement of Independence Concepts does not establish rules for auditor 
independence, which are issued by the ISB as Independence Standards.  Rather, it specifies 
various components—a definition, a goal, concepts, and basic principles—that together form a 
conceptual framework.  This framework serves as a foundation for principles-based 
Independence Standards and provides a basis for evaluating existing and proposed rules and 
practices.  Appendices to this Statement describe the major steps in developing the conceptual 
framework and the basis for the Board’s conclusions. 
 
 
DEFINING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
 
3. Quality audits improve the reliability and enhance the credibility of the financial 
reporting process, thereby contributing to its usefulness and to the efficient functioning of the 
capital markets, which serves the public interest.  The quality of audits depends on many factors, 
including the personal attributes that individual auditors bring to an engagement, the policies and 
procedures of the auditing firms in which they work, and the attitudes and actions of the 
management of those auditing firms, sometimes referred to as the “tone at the top.”  In addition, 
various self-regulatory and public regulatory bodies help ensure audit quality.  The independence 
                                                 
1 Words and phrases defined in the Glossary are set in italic type the first time they are used in 
the Statement. 
 
 
of auditors and the controls that help ensure their independence are only one source, albeit an 
important source, of quality audits. 
 
4. Auditor independence is freedom from those pressures and other factors that 
compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions. 2  This definition is not intended to imply that an auditor must be free 
from all pressures and all other factors that may affect an auditor’s decision-making ability.  The 
definition means that, to be independent, an auditor must be free only from those factors that are 
so significant that they rise to a level where they compromise, or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise, the auditor’s ability to make audit decisions without bias—that is, that the pressures 
and other factors compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, the auditor’s 
objectivity.  The level at which the auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions is, or can 
reasonably be expected to be, compromised represents a threshold that distinguishes between 
when the auditor is independent and when the auditor is not.  Reasonable expectations refer to 
rationally based beliefs of well-informed investors and other users of financial information.   
 
5. Pressures and other factors that can compromise or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise an auditor’s objectivity may arise from a wide variety of activities, relationships, 
and other circumstances as well as from various personal qualities and characteristics of auditors 
that may be sources of bias.  Regulatory and standard-setting bodies issue rules that limit or 
proscribe certain activities and relationships because they believe that those activities, 
relationships, and other circumstances represent potential sources of bias for auditors generally, 
even though some individual auditors may be impervious to the pressures that arise from those 
activities, relationships, and other circumstances.  Those rules apply to all auditors because the 
regulatory and standard-setting bodies believe that it is reasonable to expect audit decisions to be 
biased in those circumstances.  Accordingly, noncompliance with those rules might not preclude 
a particular auditor from being objective, but it would preclude the auditor from claiming to be 
independent. 
 
6. The definition suggests that auditor independence is more than just compliance with the 
rules, because not every pressure or other factor that may be a source of bias can be identified 
and covered by a rule.  To be independent, an auditor must be able, and be reasonably expected 
to be able, to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent unbiased audit decisions.  
Accordingly, the absence of a rule violation does not mean that the auditor is independent.  Even 
if a rule permits, or no rule limits or forbids, a particular activity, relationship, or other 
circumstance—for example, auditing a company in which the chief financial officer is the 
auditor’s friend—an auditor would not be independent if his or her ability to make unbiased 
audit decisions was, or would reasonably be expected to be, compromised as a result of that 
activity, relationship, or other circumstance.  Compliance with the rules is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for independence. 
 
                                                 
2 The components of the conceptual framework are set in boldface type. 
 
 
7. Assessing the independence of auditors requires independence decision makers to 
consider: 
a. the pressures and other factors that might result in, or might reasonably be 
expected to result in, biased audit decisions—defined in this Statement as threats to 
auditor independence; 
b. the controls that may reduce or eliminate the effects of those pressures and other 
factors—defined in this Statement as safeguards to auditor independence; 
c. the significance of those pressures and other factors and the effectiveness of those 
controls; and 
d. the likelihood that pressures and other factors, after considering the effectiveness 
of controls, will reach a level where they compromise, or may reasonably be expected to 
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions—defined in this 
Statement as independence risk. 
These concepts related to auditor independence are discussed in paragraphs 10–20 of this 
Statement.  Resolving auditor independence issues also requires independence decision makers 
to consider how best to meet the goal of auditor independence.  That goal is discussed in the next 
section.  Paragraphs 21–32 discuss basic principles concerning how independence decision 
makers should analyze independence risk and consider the benefits and costs of auditor 
independence and the views of interested parties. 
 
 
GOAL OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
 
8. The goal of auditor independence is to support user reliance on the financial 
reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency.  The focus of this goal is on 
independence as one aspect of quality audits—audits that improve the reliability and enhance the 
credibility of the financial reporting process.  Reliable and credible financial information, in turn, 
help ensure that users have confidence in that information.  Those outcomes are in the public 
interest because they help ensure that investors, creditors, and other capital market participants 
make appropriate resource-allocation decisions, an important element contributing to the 
efficiency of the capital markets. 
 
9. The independence of auditors helps ensure that auditors are sufficiently free from bias 
and are reasonably expected to be sufficiently free from bias.  This suggests that independence 
decision makers should make decisions that help ensure that investors and other users reasonably 
believe that auditors are independent.  If auditors are sufficiently free from bias but investors and 
other users do not believe that they are, audits may not enhance the credibility of financial 
information, and, as a result, investors and other users may place less reliance on audited 
financial information.  The basic principle set forth in paragraph 30 of this Statement describes 
how the ISB and other independence decision makers should incorporate the views of investors, 
other users, and other interested parties in their decisions. 
 
 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS 
 
10. This section describes four concepts related to auditor independence: 
a. threats to auditor independence; 
b. safeguards to auditor independence; 
c. independence risk; and 
d. significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards. 
These concepts, together with the basic principles of auditor independence described in a 
subsequent section of this Statement, are intended to help independence decision makers analyze 
auditor independence issues. 
 
 
Threats to Auditor Independence 
 
11. Threats to auditor independence are sources of potential bias that may compromise, 
or may reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit 
decisions.  Because threats may, or may reasonably be expected to, compromise an auditor’s 
ability to make unbiased audit decisions, independence decisions makers should identify and 
analyze the effects of threats that are sources of potential bias. 
 
12. Threats are posed by various types of activities, relationships, and other circumstances.  
Identifying the types of threats posed by specific activities, relationships, or other circumstances 
should help independence decision makers understand the nature of those threats and their 
potential impact on auditor independence.3  The following list provides examples of the types of 
threats that may create pressures and other factors that can lead to biased audit decisions.  
Although the list is not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, it illustrates the wide variety of threat 
types that independence decision makers need to consider when analyzing auditor independence 
issues. 
a. self-interest threats—threats that arise from auditors acting in their own interest.  
Self-interests include auditors’ emotional, financial, or other personal interests.  Auditors 
may favor, consciously or subconsciously, those self-interests over their interest in 
performing a quality audit.  For example, auditors’ relationships with auditees create a 
financial self-interest because auditees pay the auditors’ fees.  Auditors also have a 
financial self-interest if they own stock in an auditee and may have an emotional or 
financial self-interest if an employment relationship exists between an auditor’s spouse 
and an auditee.   
b. self-review threats—threats that arise from auditors reviewing their own work or 
the work done by others in their firm.  It may be more difficult to evaluate without bias 
one’s own work, or that of one’s firm, than the work of someone else or of some other 
firm.  Therefore, a self-review threat may arise when auditors review judgments and 
decisions they, or others in their firm, have made.   
                                                 
3 Although different methods of describing types of threats could be developed, the description 
used in this Statement is similar to the systems in use and under development by standard setters 
in various places outside the United States, including the United Kingdom (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales [ICAEW]), Europe (Federation des Experts Comptables 
Europeens [FEE]), and internationally (International Federation of Accountants [IFAC]). 
 
 
c. advocacy threats—threats that arise from auditors or others in their firm 
promoting or advocating for or against an auditee’s position or opinion rather than 
serving as unbiased attestors of the auditees’ financial information.  Such a threat may be 
present, for example, if an auditor or others in the auditor’s firm promote an auditee’s 
securities. 
d. familiarity (or trust) threats—threats that arise from auditors being influenced by 
a close relationship with an auditee.  Such a threat is present if auditors are not 
sufficiently skeptical of an auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too readily accept an 
auditee’s viewpoint because of their familiarity with or trust in the auditee.  For example, 
a familiarity threat may arise when an auditor has a particularly close or long-standing 
personal or professional relationship with an auditee; and   
e. intimidation threats—threats that arise from auditors being, or believing that they 
are being, overtly or covertly coerced by auditees or by other interested parties.  Such a 
threat may arise, for example, if an auditor or an auditing firm is threatened with 
replacement over a disagreement with an auditee’s application of an accounting principle. 
 
 
Safeguards to Auditor Independence 
 
13. Safeguards to auditor independence are controls that mitigate or eliminate threats 
to auditor independence.  Safeguards include prohibitions, restrictions, disclosures, policies, 
procedures, practices, standards, rules, institutional arrangements, and environmental conditions.  
Because safeguards help ensure that auditors make unbiased audit decisions in the presence of 
threats to auditor independence, independence decision makers should consider existing 
safeguards as well as new safeguards that could be put in place to mitigate or eliminate those 
threats. 
 
14. Safeguards exist in the environment in which audits are performed or can be mandated by 
independence decision makers in response to threats posed by various activities, relationships, 
and other circumstances.  One way in which safeguards can be described is by where they reside: 
a. safeguards that exist in the environment in which audits are performed.  Examples 
include:  
1. the value auditing firms and individual auditors place on their reputations; 
2. peer review programs that assess firm-wide compliance with professional 
standards and regulatory requirements regarding independence; 
3. general oversight by auditees’ audit committees and boards of directors 
concerning compliance with the regulatory requirement that an auditee’s financial 
statements be audited by auditors who are independent; 
4. other aspects of corporate governance, including an auditee’s “tone at the 
top,” that support the issuance of reliable financial information and auditor 
independence; 
5. rules, standards, and codes of professional conduct governing auditors’ 
behavior issued by public regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and state boards of accountancy, and by self-regulatory 
bodies, such as the ISB and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA);   
6. disciplinary actions, and the possibility of such actions, by the SEC, state 
boards of accountancy, the AICPA, and others; and 
7. the legal liability faced by auditors and other participants in the capital 
markets. 
b. safeguards that exist within auditing firms as part of an auditing firm’s quality 
controls.  Examples include: 
1. maintaining a “tone at the top” in the auditing firm that stresses the 
expectation that auditors will act in the public interest and the importance of 
quality audits and auditor independence; 
2. maintaining a professional environment and culture in the auditing firm 
that supports behavior of all firm personnel that is consistent with auditor 
independence; 
3. quality assurance programs that include policies, procedures, and practices 
directly related to maintaining auditor independence; 
4. other policies, procedures, and practices, such as those concerning auditee 
acceptance and retention, the rotation of engagement management, concurring 
partner reviews, and requirements for internal consultation on technical issues; 
and 
5. personnel hiring, training, promotion, retention, and reward policies, 
procedures, and practices that emphasize the importance of auditor independence, 
the potential threats posed by various circumstances that auditors in the firm may 
face, and the need for auditors to evaluate their independence with respect to a 
specific auditee after considering safeguards in place to mitigate or eliminate 
those threats.  
 
15. Another way of describing safeguards is by their nature: 
a. safeguards that are preventive—for example, an orientation program for newly 
hired auditors that emphasizes the importance of independence; 
b. safeguards that relate to threats arising in specific circumstances—for example, 
prohibitions against certain employment relationships between auditors’ family members 
and auditees; 
c. safeguards that are designed to deter violations of other safeguards by increasing 
the likelihood that they will be discovered—for example, reviews of auditors’ securities 
portfolios to detect prohibited investments; and 
d. safeguards whose effects are to deter violations of other safeguards by punishing 
violators—for example, revocations of auditors’ licenses by state boards of accountancy. 
 
16. A third way in which safeguards can be described is by the extent to which they restrict 
activities or relationships that are considered threats to auditor independence: 
a. absolute prohibition—for example, prohibiting auditors from having any direct 
financial investment in any auditees; 
b. permitting the activity or relationship but restricting its extent or form—for 
example, a restriction that auditors cannot have material indirect financial interests in 
auditees; 
c. permitting the activity or relationship but requiring other policies or procedures 
that eliminate or mitigate the threat—for example, the mandatory rotation of an 
engagement partner after the partner has spent a certain period of time on a specific audit 
engagement; and 
d. permitting the activity or relationship but requiring the auditor to disclose 
information about it to the auditee’s management, audit committee, board, or others—for 
example, disclosure to an auditee’s audit committee of the nature of all services provided 
by the auditor to the auditee and the fees received for such services. 
 
17. Safeguards may work either singly or in combination to mitigate or eliminate threats.  
Different safeguards may mitigate or eliminate different types of threats, and one safeguard may 
mitigate or eliminate several types of threats simultaneously.  For example: 
a. self-interest threats may be mitigated or eliminated by, among other safeguards, 
prohibitions against certain financial interests and family relationships between auditors 
and auditees, restrictions on the percentage of total firm fees earned from one auditee, 
and auditing firm disclosures to the audit committee of all services provided to the 
auditee; 
b. self-review threats may be mitigated or eliminated by, among other safeguards, 
concurring partner and peer reviews and prohibitions against auditors acting in the 
capacity of auditee management; 
c. advocacy threats may be mitigated or eliminated by, among other safeguards, 
prohibitions against and limitations on auditors providing certain non-audit services for 
auditees that involve advocacy roles; 
d. familiarity threats may be mitigated or eliminated by, among other safeguards, 
mandatory rotation of engagement partners and restrictions on certain employment 
relationships between auditors’ family members and auditees; and 
e. intimidation threats may be mitigated or eliminated by, among other safeguards, 
concurring partner reviews, internal consultation requirements, and an appropriate “tone 
at the top” in both auditing firms and auditees. 
 
 
Independence Risk 
 
18. Independence risk is the risk that threats to auditor independence, to the extent that 
they are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise, or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.  Independence risk 
increases in the presence of threats to auditor independence and can be mitigated or eliminated 
by safeguards.  Independence decision makers should determine whether additional safeguards 
are necessary to reduce independence risk created by particular threats and, if they are, should 
decide which safeguards will reduce such risk to an acceptable level. 
 
 
Significance of Threats and Effectiveness of Safeguards 
 
19. The significance of a threat to auditor independence is the extent to which the threat 
increases independence risk.  The significance of a specific threat depends on many factors, 
including the nature of the activity, relationship, or other circumstance creating the threat; the 
force with which pressure is exerted or felt; the importance of the matter that is the subject of the 
activity, relationship, or other circumstance; the position and level of responsibility of the 
persons involved; and the strength of the integrity of the persons involved.  Independence 
decision makers should evaluate these and other factors when assessing the threats to auditor 
independence posed by various activities, relationships, and other circumstances. 
 
20. The effectiveness of a safeguard to auditor independence is the extent to which the 
safeguard decreases independence risk.  The effectiveness of a safeguard depends on many 
factors, including whether it is suitably designed to meet its objectives, how it is applied, the 
consistency with which it is applied, by whom it is applied, and to whom it is applied.  
Independence decision makers should evaluate these and other factors when assessing safeguards 
that exist or can be put in place in response to specific activities, relationships, and other 
circumstances that pose threats to auditor independence. 
 
 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
 
21. This section discusses four basic principles of auditor independence: 
a. assessing the level of independence risk; 
b. determining the acceptability of the level of independence risk; 
c. considering benefits and costs; and 
d. considering the views of investors and other interested parties when auditor 
independence issues are addressed. 
The basic principles serve as guidelines for independence decision makers to analyze 
independence issues in a wide variety of circumstances. 
 
 
Assessing the Level of Independence Risk 
 
22. Independence decision makers should assess the level of independence risk by 
considering the types and significance of threats to auditor independence and the types and 
effectiveness of safeguards.  This basic principle describes a process by which independence 
decision makers should identify and assess the level of independence risk that arises from various 
activities, relationships, or other circumstances. 
 
23. The level of independence risk can be expressed as a point on a continuum that ranges 
from “no independence risk” to “maximum independence risk.”  One way to describe those 
endpoints, the segments of the independence risk continuum that fall between those endpoints, 
and the likelihood of compromised objectivity to which the endpoints and segments correspond 
is as follows: 
Level of Independence Risk 
No independence 
risk 
Remote 
independence 
risk  
Some 
independence 
risk 
High 
independence 
risk 
Maximum 
independence 
risk 
Compromised 
objectivity is 
virtually 
Compromised 
objectivity is 
very unlikely 
Compromised 
objectivity is 
possible 
Compromised 
objectivity is 
probable 
Compromised 
objectivity is 
virtually certain 
impossible 
 
Likelihood of Compromised Objectivity 
 
Although it cannot be measured precisely, the level of independence risk for any specific 
activity, relationship, or other circumstance that may pose a threat to auditor independence can 
be described as being in one of the segments, or at one of the endpoints, on the independence risk 
continuum. 
 
 
Determining the Acceptability of the Level of Independence Risk 
 
24. Independence decision makers should determine whether the level of independence 
risk is at an acceptable position on the independence risk continuum.  This basic principle 
describes the need for independence decision makers to evaluate the acceptability of the level of 
independence risk that arises from specific activities, relationships, and other circumstances.  
That evaluation requires them to judge whether safeguards eliminate or adequately mitigate 
threats to auditor independence posed by those activities, relationships, or other circumstances.  
If they do not, independence decision makers should decide which additional safeguard 
(including prohibition) or combination of safeguards would reduce independence risk, and the 
corresponding likelihood of compromised objectivity, to an acceptably low level. 
 
25. Given certain factors in the environment in which audits take place—for example, that 
the auditor is paid by the auditee—independence risk cannot be completely eliminated and, 
therefore, independence decision makers always accept some risk that auditors’ objectivity will 
be compromised.  Nevertheless, in the presence of threats to auditor independence, independence 
decision makers should consider only a very low level of independence risk to be acceptable.  
Only such a small likelihood of compromised objectivity is consistent with both the definition 
and the goal of auditor independence. 
 
26. Some threats to auditor independence may affect only certain individuals or groups 
within an auditing firm, and the significance of some threats may be different for different 
individuals or groups.  To ensure that independence risk is at an acceptably low level, 
independence decision makers should identify the individuals or groups affected by threats to 
auditor independence and the significance of those threats.  Different types of safeguards may be 
appropriate for different individuals and groups depending on their roles in the audit.  
 
 
Considering Benefits and Costs 
 
27. Independence decision makers should ensure that the benefits resulting from 
reducing independence risk by imposing additional safeguards exceed the costs of those 
safeguards.  Although benefits and costs are often difficult to identify and quantify, 
independence decision makers should consider them when they make decisions about auditor 
independence issues. 
 
28. The benefits of auditor independence are efficiencies and other positive direct and 
indirect effects that accrue to various parties.  For example: 
a. for investors and other users of financial information, auditor independence helps 
ensure quality audits and the reliability of the financial reporting process, which also may 
lead to increased confidence in that reliability.  These benefits, in turn, help improve 
investors’ and other users’ resource-allocation decisions and, ultimately, the overall 
efficiency of the capital markets, an outcome that is in the public interest. 
b. for auditees, auditor independence helps reduce their cost of capital by reducing 
the premium that investors and creditors demand as compensation for assuming the risk 
that they will make incorrect decisions because the financial information used in making 
those decisions contains material misstatements or omissions.  
c. for auditees’ boards of directors, audit committees, and senior management, 
auditor independence helps ensure the reliability of financial information prepared by 
lower-level management. 
d. for auditees and auditors, auditor independence may help reduce litigation and 
related costs resulting from alleged and actual situations involving unreliable financial 
information; and 
e. for individual auditors, auditing firms, and the auditing profession as a whole, 
independence may help enhance their reputational capital. 
 
29. Various parties bear a variety of costs of maintaining auditor independence.  Some of 
those costs relate directly to developing, maintaining, and enforcing safeguards, including the 
costs of auditing firms’ independence-related quality controls and costs related to the systems of 
public regulation and self-regulation of auditor independence.  Other, indirect costs of 
maintaining auditor independence, sometimes called “second-order effects” or “unintended 
consequences,” also may exist.  Those costs relate to possible reductions in audit quality or other 
negative outcomes that may result from safeguards that prohibit or restrict auditors’ activities 
and relationships.  For example, restrictions on auditor investments and on employment of an 
auditor’s family members by auditees may reduce the attractiveness of auditing firms as 
employers and thereby lead to reduced audit quality.  The direct and indirect costs of maintaining 
auditor independence may be affected by many variables, including the number of individuals in 
a firm who will be affected by a safeguard.  Because the independence of auditors is important 
not only in its own right but also in helping ensure that broad public interest objectives are met, 
independence decision makers should consider second-order effects or unintended consequences 
that go beyond the direct impact of their decisions on the independence of auditors. 
 
 
Considering Interested Parties’ Views in Addressing Auditor Independence Issues 
 
30. Independence decision makers should consider the views of investors, other users, 
and others with an interest in the integrity of financial reporting when addressing issues 
related to auditor independence and should resolve those issues based on the decision 
makers’ judgment about how best to meet the goal of auditor independence.  Because of its 
responsibility for issuing independence standards for all auditors of public entities, the ISB’s 
process of considering interested parties’ views is somewhat different from that of other 
independence decision makers. 
 
31. In recognition of its broad responsibilities, the ISB’s operating policies provide for 
extensive participation by various parties in its standard-setting process.  By keeping informed 
about the views of various types of individuals and groups, the ISB gains insight into reasonable 
expectations about auditor independence, an important aspect of the definition and goal of 
auditor independence described in this conceptual framework.  The ISB considers the views of 
interested parties in deciding what standards are necessary to help ensure that auditors are free 
from pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, 
auditors’ ability to make unbiased audit decisions.  Effective communication of ISB decisions, 
and of the reasoning that underlies them, also may help ensure that the ISB’s constituents believe 
that auditors who comply with ISB decisions are free from such pressures and other factors.  The 
basic principle described above is consistent with the ISB’s broad responsibilities to gather 
information about the views of interested parties on auditor independence issues and to consider 
those views.  The process of considering the views of interested parties described in the basic 
principle does not, however, abrogate the ISB’s responsibility to exercise its own judgment in 
setting independence standards that are consistent with both the definition and the goal of auditor 
independence.   
 
32. Independence decision makers other than the ISB also should find this basic principle 
useful when they consider independence issues in the absence of specific standards or rules.  It 
should help ensure that they appropriately consider how their constituencies might view their 
decisions.  In order to achieve the goal of auditor independence described in this framework, all 
independence decision makers, including the ISB, should be sensitive to the likely views of 
investors, other users, and other interested parties, and the impact their decisions may have on 
those views. 
APPENDIX  A—GLOSSARY 
 
33. This appendix contains definitions of certain terms or phrases used in this Statement. 
 
Auditees 
 
Entities whose financial information is being audited. 
 
Credibility 
 
The quality of information that makes it believable.  
 
Independence decision makers 
 
Individuals, groups, and entities that make judgments about auditor independence issues.  
Independence decision makers include: 
• the ISB and other independence standard setters 
• auditing firms in adopting independence policies and procedures in the absence of 
existing rules or standards 
• individual auditors in assessing their own independence and in making decisions when 
faced with situations for which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy 
• the management, audit committees, and boards of directors of auditees in meeting their 
responsibilities to retain auditors who are independent 
• regulators in meeting their responsibilities to ensure the independence of auditors. 
 
Objectivity 
 
In the context of an audit, the ability to make unbiased audit decisions. 
 
Quality audit 
 
An audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
 
Reliability 
 
“The quality of information that assures that information is reasonably free from error 
and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.”4 
Users 
 
                                                 
4 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, 
Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1980), “Glossary 
of Terms.”  
 
Investors, creditors, and others who use audited financial information in making 
investment, credit, and similar decisions. 
APPENDIX B—BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
34. The ISB was formed in 1997 to establish standards governing the independence of 
auditors of public entities. As part of its initial charge, the Board was given the task of 
developing a conceptual framework for auditor independence on which future independence 
standards could be based. 
 
35. Discussion Memorandum (DM) 00-1, A Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence, was prepared with input from a broad-based project task force consisting of 
representatives of investor groups, audit committee members, attorneys, regulators, other 
independence standard setters, members of the auditing profession, corporate executives, and 
academics specializing in ethics, accounting, auditing, and other business-related fields.  A 
Board oversight task force provided further direction and assisted in reviewing the DM.  The DM 
was considered by the Board at meetings on January 14 and February 17, 2000 and was released 
in February 2000 for a public comment period that ended on May 31, 2000.  Comments also 
were solicited directly from specific individuals and groups in the academic, standard-setting, 
and investor communities.  Twenty-two comment letters were received.  After considering these 
letters, and with further assistance from the oversight and project task forces, this Exposure Draft 
(ED) of a proposed Statement of Independence Concepts was developed. 
APPENDIX C—BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS 
 
36. This appendix discusses the issues that the Board considered most important in arriving 
at conclusions about the components of the proposed conceptual framework.  It describes the 
Board’s reasons for accepting certain views and for rejecting others. 
 
 
Defining Auditor Independence 
 
37. A definition provides a common language for all parties to debate auditor independence 
issues.  The definition of auditor independence discussed in paragraphs 3–6 is based on a 
personal attributes approach.  It defines auditor independence in terms of freedom from pressures 
and other factors that lead to biased audit decisions—a personal attribute that helps ensure that 
auditors perform quality audits.  Paragraph 5 notes that those pressures and other factors may 
arise from certain activities, relationships, and other circumstances.  That is, auditors who are 
free of external indicators of pressures and other factors—by not undertaking certain activities, 
having certain relationships, or facing certain circumstances—are more likely to perform a 
quality audit because they are more likely not to face pressures that compromise their ability to 
make unbiased audit decisions.  Accordingly, the definition also is compatible with the activities 
and relationships approach described in DM 00-1.  
 
38. The Board considered alternative definitions of auditor independence based solely on an 
activities and relationships approach.  The Board acknowledges that there are many who believe 
that those definitions are more useful to independence decision makers because they include 
observable external indicators of a lack of independence.  The Board, however, decided not to 
adopt an activities and relationships approach in developing a definition of auditor independence 
because it believes that a definition based on that approach describes how independence can be 
demonstrated (i.e., by an auditor not participating in certain activities or having certain 
relationships) rather than specifying what independence is (i.e., freedom from pressures and 
other factors).  Nevertheless, the Board recognizes that investors, users, and other interested 
parties ordinarily cannot obtain information about pressures and other factors that may affect a 
specific auditor’s ability in a specific audit engagement to make unbiased audit decisions.  They 
rely on independence decision makers to identify and analyze various activities, relationships, 
and other circumstances that are sources of pressures and other factors that can reasonably be 
expected to lead to biased audit decisions, and to adopt appropriate safeguards, if necessary, to 
reduce independence risk to an acceptably low level. 
 
39. The phrase “that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s 
ability to make unbiased audit decisions” in the definition in paragraph 4 implies that 
independence does not require complete freedom from all pressures that an auditor may face—
that is not possible.  Biases arise from an individual auditor’s background, education, and 
experiences and are part of human nature; they can be either conscious or subconscious and can 
be either in favor of or against specific individuals, groups, organizations, ideas, or principles.  
Nevertheless, pressures and other factors posed by certain activities, relationships, and other 
circumstances may endanger the quality of audits if they compromise an auditor’s ability to 
make unbiased audit decisions.  The definition of auditor independence in paragraph 4 suggests 
that only pressures and other factors that rise to a level that prevents, or can reasonably be 
expected to prevent, an auditor from making unbiased audit decisions and that are not adequately 
mitigated or eliminated by controls would preclude an auditor from being independent. 
 
40. The Board believes that the term “compromise” in the definition means that the auditor is 
unable to make unbiased audit decisions.  The Board considered using the term “impair” instead 
of the term “compromise” in this context, but believes that “compromise” more clearly implies 
that the pressure or other factor must rise to a level where an unbiased audit decision cannot be 
made.  That is, auditors can be affected by pressures and other factors that do not bias audit 
decisions.  The Board believes that, in those circumstances, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased 
audit decisions may be considered to be impaired (i.e., affected to some degree) but it is not 
compromised. 
 
41. The Board considered whether the definition in paragraph 4 could be interpreted to mean 
that independence is unconditional or absolute—that is, that independence requires an auditor to 
be completely free from pressures.  The Board believes, however, that the definition describes a 
state that an auditor can attain, namely, the ability to make unbiased audit decisions.  As 
indicated in the preceding paragraph, the term “compromise” means that the pressure must rise 
to a level where an unbiased audit decision cannot be made.  Accordingly, the Board believes 
that the approach in this Statement is useful for independence decision makers.  That approach 
includes a definition that specifies the attainable attribute that the Board believes most clearly 
describes the independence of auditors.  The other components of the framework provide 
guidance for independence decision makers in applying this definition when they examine 
potential indicators of pressures and other factors, assess the risk that those pressures and other 
factors compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, the auditor’s objectivity, and 
analyze whether that risk is acceptably low. 
 
42. The definition in paragraph 4 focuses both on what auditor independence is and on 
investors’ and other users’ reasonable expectations about auditor independence.  The Board 
believes this is consistent with its mission: “to establish independence standards applicable to 
audits of public entities in order to serve the public interest and to protect and promote investors’ 
confidence in the securities markets” (Operating Policies, Article 1). 
 
43. The Board included the phrase “or can reasonably be expected to compromise” to 
incorporate investors’ and other users’ reasonable expectations in the definition of auditor 
independence.  The Board acknowledges that there are many who believe that expectations, 
beliefs, views, and perceptions should not be a major focus of decisions on auditor independence 
matters and, therefore, should not be an element in the definition.  In the Board’s view, however, 
independence decision makers should consider investors’ and other users’ reasonable 
expectations about an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions because such 
consideration is necessary to ensure that the goal of auditor independence is achieved—a goal 
that includes helping to support user reliance on the financial reporting process. 
 
44. The Board believes that incorporating in the definition the notion of rationally based 
expectations of well-informed investors and other users helps make it operational.  Instead of 
describing auditor independence purely as a state of mind that cannot be observed, measured, or 
evaluated, a definition that incorporates the expectations of well-informed investors and other 
users provides independence decision makers with an objective way to assess when auditors 
possess the personal attribute of independence. 
 
45. The Board considered including a phrase in the definition of auditor independence that 
would specify which interested parties’ expectations are to be considered, such as “a reasonably 
informed person who has knowledge of all relevant facts.”  Such a phrase would serve to clarify 
that “reasonable expectations” result from a good faith determination by independence decision 
makers about how well-informed investors and other users might view an issue, not from a poll 
of the decision makers’ constituents.  The Board believes, however, that even “reasonably 
informed” investors and other users are likely to have divergent views about specific 
independence issues.  The Board decided, therefore, that instead of specifying explicitly in the 
definition whose beliefs are to be considered, it is more useful to include in the conceptual 
framework a basic principle (see paras. 30–32) that describes how the views of interested parties 
should be considered in addressing auditor independence issues. 
 
46. The Board decided not to include the phrase “independence in fact” in the definition.  
Including that phrase would have emphasized the notion that it is auditor independence itself, 
irrespective of anyone’s expectations about independence, that helps ensure reliable financial 
information.  The Board believes that, although the phrase has been widely used in the literature, 
it can easily be misinterpreted because it suggests a level of certainty or measurability about the 
existence of auditor independence that neither independence decision makers nor others can 
achieve.  The Board also believes that including a phrase such as “independence in fact” in the 
definition would be inconsistent with the personal attributes approach adopted by the Board.  
That is, whether an auditor is, or can reasonably be considered to be, free from pressures and 
other factors is not a fact that can be objectively determined. 
 
 
Goal of Auditor Independence 
 
47. A goal of auditor independence serves as a guide for the Board in setting standards.  It 
also assists other independence decision makers in analyzing auditor independence issues when 
ISB standards or other rules do not address particular circumstances that may compromise an 
auditor’s objectivity. 
 
48. The goal in paragraph 8 does not focus on independence as an end in itself but on 
independence as a means to support investor and other user reliance on the financial reporting 
process and to enhance capital market efficiency.  Those broad purposes help make the goal 
aspirational, and the Board believes that an aspirational goal will be helpful to both the Board 
itself and other independence decision makers when making decisions on auditor independence 
issues.  The goal also provides a basis for the Board and other independence decision makers to 
consider the benefits and costs associated with both reliable financial information and capital 
market efficiency.  For example, allowing auditees to hire their former auditors in certain 
situations—that is, subject to certain safeguards—may increase independence risk, but the skills 
of those former auditors also may enhance capital market efficiency by helping auditees generate 
more reliable financial information and by increasing the attractiveness of the profession to high-
quality individuals.   
 
 
Auditor Independence Concepts 
 
49. Paragraphs 10–20 describe four concepts relevant to auditor independence decisions: 
a. threats to auditor independence; 
b. safeguards to auditor independence; 
c. independence risk; and 
d. significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards. 
These concepts are elements of a risk model for auditor independence that the Board believes 
will assist independence decision makers in understanding and analyzing auditor independence 
issues.  In this model, independence risk is a function of the significance of threats and the 
effectiveness of safeguards.  An auditor is independent when independence risk is at an 
acceptably low level, as determined by a particular independence decision maker.  As indicated 
in paragraphs 27–32, the costs and benefits of auditor independence and the views of interested 
parties should enter into independence decision makers’ considerations of auditor independence 
issues; however, they do not affect the level of independence risk. 
 
50. The model acknowledges the importance of materiality by incorporating the concepts of 
the significance of threats and the effectiveness of safeguards.  Assessing independence risk 
requires analyzing the significance of threats to auditor independence posed by a specific 
activity, relationship, or other circumstance and the effectiveness of the safeguards that are, or 
could be put, in place to mitigate or eliminate specific threats.  Because of the large number of 
potential threats and safeguards that are not susceptible to quantification—for example, the 
impact of family relationships—the Board concluded that it is preferable to use the more general 
terms “significance of threats” and “effectiveness of safeguards,” rather than “materiality,” 
which is more frequently associated with quantitative measures or guidelines.  Some threats and 
safeguards are susceptible to quantification, however, and independence decision makers may 
determine that their significance and effectiveness can be evaluated, in whole or in part, by 
reference to numeric benchmarks. 
 
51. Cost–benefit considerations and the views of interested parties in auditor independence 
are not part of the independence risk model, but they are constraints that may affect the 
independence decision-making process. The basic principles related to costs and benefits and the 
views of interested parties that are described in this Statement should be considered by 
independence decision makers when they determine whether the level of independence risk 
posed by specific activities, relationships, or other circumstances is acceptable. 
 
52. The Board believes that  
a. it is appropriate for independence decision makers to think in terms of 
independence risk rather than in terms of the existence or nonexistence of independence; 
b. considering the level of independence risk requires analyzing threats to auditor 
independence and the effectiveness of various safeguards in the face of those threats; and 
c. when evaluating the acceptability of the level of independence risk, independence 
decision makers should consider related benefits and costs and the views of interested 
parties. 
 
 
Basic Principles of Auditor Independence 
 
Assessing the Level of Independence Risk 
 
53. Under the basic principle described in paragraphs 22–23, independence decision makers’ 
judgments about the level of independence risk can be expressed as a position on a continuum 
that extends from one endpoint, at which compromised objectivity is virtually impossible, to 
another, at which compromised objectivity is virtually certain.  Because an auditor’s objectivity 
cannot be directly observed, independence decision makers must rely on judgment to assess 
independence risk in various situations.  When faced with identical threats and safeguards, the 
likelihood that an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions will be compromised 
depends, in part, on the individual’s personal attributes, such as integrity.  In addition, the 
judgments of different independence decision makers about the level of independence risk posed 
by specific activities, relationships, and other circumstances also are likely to differ as a result of 
differences in judgment as to the significance of the threats posed and the effectiveness of 
alternative safeguards.  Because of the extent of judgment involved in assessing auditor 
independence, the Board believes that it is useful for independence decision makers to view 
independence risk as a continuum and the level of independence risk as a position on that 
continuum.  After considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances, independence decision 
makers should assess the level of independence risk in a particular situation and then reach a 
conclusion about whether that level is such that an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit 
decisions would be, or would reasonably be expected to be, compromised—that is, whether the 
auditor would not be independent. 
 
 
Determining the Acceptability of the Level of Independence Risk 
 
54. The Board believes that a principle based on achieving the “no independence risk” 
endpoint of the independence risk continuum for all threats to auditor independence is unrealistic 
and, in some circumstances, may be undesirable.  Such a principle would mandate that 
independence decision makers adopt safeguards that provide “absolute assurance” of auditor 
independence, a level of assurance that audits themselves are not designed to provide.  The 
Board believes that no safeguard or set of safeguards can be completely effective in eliminating 
all independence risk.  The Board also believes that, in some cases, the costs (both direct and 
indirect) of attempting to get closer to the “no independence risk” endpoint on the continuum 
may exceed the benefits of reducing independence risk.  The Board concluded that the basic 
principle described in paragraphs 24–26, which establishes an objective of reducing 
independence risk to a very low level, will help independence decision makers decide whether 
additional safeguards are necessary to mitigate threats to auditor independence.   
 
 
Considering Benefits and Costs 
 
55. The Board believes that, if independence decision makers judge that additional 
safeguards are necessary in order to reduce independence risk to an acceptably low level, they 
often will be faced with choices among alternative safeguards and with different ways of 
applying particular safeguards that vary in terms of benefits and costs.  Although the Board 
recognizes that those choices require independence decision makers to exercise judgment, the 
Board believes that the guidance provided by the basic principle described in paragraphs 27–29 
will help independence decision makers make such choices.  The Board recognizes the difficulty 
of identifying and measuring many of the benefits and costs of auditor independence, especially 
the “second-order effects” or “unintended consequences” of maintaining auditor independence.  
Nevertheless, the Board believes that independence decision makers should, to the extent 
possible, weigh both the direct and indirect benefits and costs of safeguards they are considering.  
In many cases, independence decision makers may not need to consider the total dollar amount 
of benefits and costs of a particular safeguard, but rather only the incremental benefits and costs 
of that safeguard as compared with others. 
 
 
Considering Interested Parties’ Views in Addressing Auditor Independence Issues 
 
56. The Board considered three alternative approaches to a basic principle concerning how 
beliefs about auditor independence should be included in its standard-setting process: develop 
standards that reflect the views of all interested parties; develop standards that reflect the likely 
views of reasonable, fully informed investors or some other group or groups of interested parties; 
or be informed by interested parties’ views but base standards on the Board’s judgment about 
how best to meet the goal of auditor independence.  The Board believes that adopting either of 
the first two alternatives as a basic principle would inappropriately restrict it in making 
independence judgments, especially if those judgments differed from the short-term views of 
some interested parties.  In addition, because different individuals and groups are likely to have 
diverse views on auditor independence issues, basing decisions on those views is often 
impossible or impractical.   
 
57. The Board believes that a basic principle based on the process described in the third 
alternative emphasizes that the Board itself—whose members come from diverse constituencies 
and are chosen to represent the public interest based on their experience and integrity—is in the 
best position to establish appropriate independence standards.  The Board’s due process includes 
a thorough evaluation of all available information, including obtaining input from interested 
parties through its task forces, reviewing all responses to documents issued for public exposure, 
and in various other ways.  Under the basic principle described in paragraphs 30–31, the Board 
should neither ignore interested parties’ views nor base its decisions solely on those views.  
Instead, the Board should solicit the views of all interested parties about the issues and consider 
the potential impact of alternative decisions on those views. 
 
58. The Board believes that effective communication with all interested parties can help 
inform them about its agenda, the process it uses to promulgate independence standards, and the 
reasoning underlying its standards.  The Board provides a variety of opportunities for interested 
parties to furnish timely input to it—for example, Board task forces and working groups include 
representatives from many organizations, and the Board distributes discussion memoranda and 
exposure drafts widely to encourage interested parties to share their views with it.  At various 
stages in its standard-setting process, the Board communicates its views on the nature of the 
threats that it believes are posed in the circumstances under consideration and the reasons why it 
believes that certain safeguards are the best solution in those circumstances.  The Board also 
explains the bases for its conclusions, both in ISB standards and through other media.  These and 
similar efforts by the Board to ensure effective communications with all interested parties should 
help increase their confidence in the organizations and processes involved in ensuring auditor 
independence as well as in the reliability of the financial reporting process and in the 
independence of auditors generally. 
 
59. The Board believes that when other independence decision makers address auditor 
independence issues, they also should consider the views of interested parties.  Those 
independence decision makers should ask, in their own informed good faith views, whether well-
informed investors and other users would reasonably consider the activities, relationships, or 
other circumstances in question as precluding independence. 
